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 In Americans’ minds, China’s rise to economic superpower status may evoke images of 
economic influence in Asian or African countries, or just the amount of U.S. dollar reserves the 
Chinese Government holds.  But what happens when China quietly steps into America’s pre-
eminent geographical sphere of influence and dominion: Latin America?  After all, when was the 
last (first) time that you heard that a U.S. president visited a Latin American country to increase 
American exports to the region and create jobs at home?  The answers to these questions lie 
within a careful analysis of the U.S. relationship with Latin America and the implications that a 
Chinese economic and diplomatic takeover of the region may have for the U.S. as the pre-
eminent superpower in the Western Hemisphere and the world.   
To the surprise of many Americans, President Obama visited Brazil in early spring 
2011to achieve these two goals—increase American exports to Latin America and, thereby, 
create jobs in the U.S.  The economic decline of the U.S. and its political decline in the region 
and America’s need for increased exports and jobs, the new and, arguably, the economic rise of  
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)  have caused a historic shift in the relationship between 
America and Latin American countries.  Notwithstanding the merits of Brazil’s rise to quasi-
economic superpower status the best compelling reason for reasserting America’s lost influence 
in Latin America is PRC’s rising influence in the region.  America can recover much of its lost 
influence and thrive in Latin America, even if other economic superpowers exercise their 
influence in the region.  The U.S. needs to start a new and open dialogue with the countries of 
the region and offer it military and economic aid with more favorable terms than the aid provided 
by PRC to the region.     
According to Fareed Zakaria, one of the most influential public intellectuals of his 
generation and the editor of Newsweek International, this generation (the Millennials or 
Generation Y as some would call it) will know a “Post-American world,” which means a “world 
[where] the United States is [no longer] the director of all that happens.” The indicators of this 
shift in the playing field of global politics and economics are apparent.  For instance, while the 
U.S. has faced the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression over the past three years, 
PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at over nine percent per year, according to 
statistics from the World Bank (2010).  A world dominated by multiple superpowers—a 
multipolar world—is at hand and Latin America is not absent from being affected by such a 
world.     
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The Importance of Latin America and U.S. History of Involvement in the Region 
The U.S. has exercised significant influence in the Latin American region for much of the 
last two centuries.  However, during the past two centuries, the U.S. has been linked to coups and 
military interventions in more than half a dozen countries in the region.  For instance, the U.S. 
has established its military presence or has been linked to military coups in Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela.  All of these interventions into the internal affairs of these 
countries have had one thing in common:  They were meant to protect U.S. interests.  This has 
resulted in these countries’ distrust of U.S. intentions in the region.   
 Several of the region’s demagogues, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Cuba’s Fidel 
& Raul Castro, have exploited this distrust and used it to blame the U.S. for everything that goes 
wrong in the region.  Of course, these demagogues’ goal is to distract their people from the real 
problems facing their countries and the promises they have not been able to deliver.  As Peter 
Hakim—the President of the Inter-American Dialogue, the leading Washington, DC think tank 
on western hemisphere affairs—states, “The United States is not the only culprit, however.  Most 
Latin American governments have only partially completed the political and economic reforms 
needed to sustain robust growth and healthy democratic institutions” (Hakim, 2006).   
Yet, despite the distrust and the region’s demagogues’ exploitation of it, the U.S. 
continues to be the most important trade partner of all Latin American countries.  In fact, the 
U.S. has signed free trade agreements with the Dominican Republic and all of the Central 
American countries (DR-CAFTA), Mexico, Chile, and Peru.  According to the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the U.S. has also signed free trade agreements with Colombia and 
Panama, but the Obama Administration has not yet submitted them for Senate approval.  In any 
event, in 2009, the volume of trade between the U.S. and Latin American countries (excluding 
Mexico) amounted to 8.3 percent of America’s total annual trade of more than $200 billion 
dollars a year, according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service (Hornbeck, 2011).   
Furthermore, the U.S. continues to be the primary destination for migrants of the 
region—linking the U.S. more to its pre-eminent sphere of power.  Even though a growing 
number of the region’s migrants have left for Europe, especially Spain, the U.S. continues to be 
the largest recipient of migrants from the region, not only due to its geographical proximity, but 
also because of the history of immigration from the region and the U.S. immigration policies 
favoring family reunification (Monger, & Yankay, 2010).  According to statistics from the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, in 2010 alone close to two-thirds of all the new legal 
immigrants to the U.S. were granted legal permanent resident status to the U.S. based on a family 
relationship with a U.S. citizen or a legal permanent resident (Monger, & Yankay, 2010).  In 
2010, approximately twenty-six (26) percent of all the legal immigrants admitted to the United 
States came from Latin America, excluding the legal immigrants from Mexico who represent a 
significant portion of the U.S. legal immigrant population (Monger, & Yankay, 2010).  
Excluding the number of illegal immigrants coming to the U.S. from Latin America every year 
and for whom it may be difficult to account, it is clear that Latin American migration to the U.S. 
continues to represent a large percentage of the U.S. legal immigrant population.   
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But why is Latin America so important to the U.S.?  Why is it that losing Latin America 
to another superpower could be a detriment to the U.S. and its interests?  Why should Americans 
care about the region?  Of course, they should care.  It is the where the U.S. should be focusing 
its efforts— in winning the hearts and minds of Latin Americans, the pre-eminent region of 
influence.   
First of all, unlike in previous decades, when the region experienced long periods of 
hyperinflation, Latin America is no longer a region in economic crisis.  In fact, it is a region in 
constant economic progress.  In 2009, for instance, at least four Latin American countries ranked 
among the top 30 economies in the world in terms of gross domestic product (the amount of 
goods and services produced by a country during a year), according to the World Bank.  Brazil, 
for instance, ranks as the 8th largest economy of the world, while Mexico and Argentina rank as 
the top 14th and 30th economies respectively (World Bank, 2010).  In addition to these 
indicators, the region has experienced continuous GDP growth in the recent years of turmoil the 
world economy has undergone.  From 2004 to 2010, the Latin American region’s economies as a 
whole grew at an average pace of 4 percent, and it is predicted that it will continue to grow at 
below 3 percent (Froymovich, 2010).  As Gabriel Torres, an economist for Moody’s, the credit 
rating agency, “Latin America did very well in this [economic] crisis, better than we would have 
expected.”  (Froymovich, 2010).   
The Cuban Missile Crisis sheds light to the continuing strategic importance of Latin 
America for the U.S.   In 1962, the U.S. imposed a blockaded to all shipments to Cuba because 
the Soviets had placed nuclear weapons less than 100 miles from the U.S.  The issue is what 
would happen if the Chinese decide to negotiate with Latin American countries, many of which 
are governed by regimes with political ideologies that may be inconsistent with U.S. style 
democracy, and place some of their nuclear weapons within close reach to the U.S. Mainland?  
What would happen in such a case?  No geopolitical strategist in his right mind can argue that 
allowing another superpower to exercise military and economic influence in the western 
hemisphere would neither have policy implications, nor constitute a threat to the U.S.  
Geography has not changed (and may never do during our lifetime) and what happened fifty 
years ago can occur today and with greater implications.  Does this suggest the end of the old 
Monroe doctrine..  The Monroe Doctrine issued by President James Monroe in 1823 held that 
America was off limits to any European power.  As Antonio C. Hsiang, an Associate Professor at 
the Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan, states, “The geo-strategic implications of this 
development are broad: China’s presence in the region not only has serious impacts on the U.S.’s 
role in its ‘backyard,’ it has consequences for the security situation in the Taiwan Strait” 
(Hsiang, 2009).   
But what about U.S. influence in other regions of the world?  Would anything change 
because of PRC’s involvement in Latin America?  Would PRC’s involvement in Latin America 
eventually force the U.S. to retreat from Asia in terms of its military presence and reduce its 
protection of Taiwan?  That might be is a good question for geopolitical strategists.  Denis C. 
Blair, the former U.S. Director of National Intelligence, quoted in an article by  A. C. Hsiang   
that the U.S. goal in the dispute between Taiwan and PRC is to “make sure that military 
adventures are unattractive [to both sides]” (Hsiang, 2009).  The recognition of the American 
role as a mediator in such conflict is important because, if it comes down to negotiations as to the 
limits of PRC’s presence in the sphere of influence of the U.S., PRC could bargain for limits on 
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the U.S. presence in PRC’s sphere of influence in Asia—and ultimately force the U.S. to retreat 
protecting Taiwan against PRC aggression (no matter the prevalent treaties—this is about two 
world powers competing against each other for influence around the world).  In other words, if 
PRC’s presence in Latin America becomes so extensive militarily in the future 20 years that it 
can protect some countries like Cuba and Venezuela from aggression from the U.S., then PRC 
can try to put more pressure on the U.S. to limit its presence in Asia and stop protecting Republic 
of China (ROC) in exchange for the same in return in Latin America.   
Yet, Latin America is no longer solely dependent on the U.S. for most of its foreign 
investments’ receipts.   Globalization has allowed the free movements of capital around the 
world and Latin America has not been exempted from this phenomenon.  The PRC Government, 
for one, has shown a willingness to invest in Latin America.  In 2008, for instance, the PRC 
Government joined the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Latin America’s premier 
development bank located in Washington, DC, with a $350 million investment in the bank 
(Kraul, 2008).  This important investment commitment by the Chinese Government with the 
Bank and the region shows that PRC’s involvement in Latin America will not be short-lived, but 
long-lasting.  But does PRC’s involvement in the region really pose a threat to the U.S. 
hegemonic status in Latin America? 
 
To What Extent is China a Threat to U.S. Hegemony in the Region? 
There is not a clear answer to this question.  Yet, whether one looks at the short or the 
long term implications of PRC’s presence in Latin America, something becomes clear:  PRC has 
more money at its disposal than any other country in the world and could well use it to invest and 
start to influence politics in the region. The latest PRC report noted that PRC has $3 Trillion in 
foreign reserves at its disposal, making it the world’s largest holder of foreign reserves (assets 
held in foreign denominated currency).  (McDonald, 2011).  Yet, PRC  has shown a further 
commitment to investing and developing meaningful relationships with the countries in the 
region—at least with those with the largest economies—as evidenced by the fact that PRC 
investments in Latin America represented fifty percent of all Chinese investments outside the 
mainland in 2006 (Erickson, & Chen, 2007).   
Whether or not PRC’s involvement in the region constitutes a threat to the U.S. 
hegemonic status in Latin America, PRC’s reach into the region offers Latin Americans a fresh 
opportunity to diversify its diplomatic and economic relations.  As A.C. Hsiang noted quoting 
Richard N. Haass, the President of the influential Council on Foreign Relations:  “[Latin 
American countries] have not only grown stronger but have expanded relations with others … 
[and this has resulted in a region that is] shaping its future far more than it shaped its past.” 
(Hsiang, 2009 p.35) (Internal quotations omitted) Further,   Hsiang (2009) suggests that two 
reasons may explain PRC’s increasing involvement in Latin America: 1) The post-Iraq War 
“relative” U.S. political and economic decline after its post-Cold War moment of pre-eminent 
world power status; and 2) The willingness of Latin American countries to assert their 
“diplomatic independence” away from Washington by engaging in diplomatic and economic 
relations with countries with objectives inconsistent with American interests (p. 36).  Latin 
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American countries now have, like never before, an opportunity to shape their future by 
diversifying their economic and diplomatic ties beyond the Western Hemisphere.   
In the economic front, PRC’s investments in Latin America have focused on the purchase 
of commodities.  For instance, Brazil exports more goods to PRC than to any other country 
(except the U.S.), and these exports are mainly commodities, such as iron ore, steel, soy oil, and 
soybeans (Santiso, 2007).  In addition, Venezuela and PRC entered into an agreement to build 
infrastructure projects in Venezuela and oil refineries in PRC, in order to process Venezuela’s oil 
(Santiso, 2007).  All in all, PRC imports from the region amounted to $60 billion in 2006, which 
is more than the GDP of many of the countries in the region; PRC’s investments in the region are 
expected to increase to $100 billion by 2014 (Erikson, & Chen, 2007, pp. 75-76).  Furthermore, 
by 2012 Venezuela is scheduled to provide PRC with 1 billion barrels of oil a day—becoming a 
very important supplier of PRC energy sources (Hsiang, 2009).   
Yet, in the long run, the economic relations China may foster in the region may threaten 
to displace the U.S. from its position as the pre-eminent economic power in the region.  As of 
this writing, PRC has entered into free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru 
(Qingfen, 2011).  The fact of the matter is that PRC recognizes the potential of the region.  As 
Wan Jifel, the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, quoted 
by Qingfen points out: “Many Latin American nations are emerging economies, which expand 
quickly.  This leaves various investment opportunities to PRC companies” (Qinfen, 2011).   
PRC has several advantages over the U.S. in dealing with Latin America.  Unlike the 
U.S., whom many countries in the region see with suspicion due to, some would argue, its 
excessive influence and its support for repressive regimes during the last century, PRC has no 
such reputation in Latin America.  To the contrary, as Professor Antonio Hsiang points out, 
PRC’s goal in the region is cooperation, not economic or political dominance over it.  As Hsiang 
(2009) states: “PRC's policy goals in the region include: promoting mutual respect and mutual 
trust and expanding common ground; deepening cooperation and achieving win-win results; 
drawing on each other’s strengths to boost common progress and intensify exchanges” (p. 39).   
Furthermore, PRC is in a better position to cooperate with Latin America than the U.S. by 
virtue of its status as a developing country.  Like Latin American countries, PRC—a developing 
country itself—opposes imperialism and the hegemonic domination of Latin America by the 
U.S.  (Hsiang, 2009).  Therefore, one of the main goals of PRC’s involvement in Latin America 
is to “counterbalan[ce] American hegemony by enhancing multilateral relations” (Hsiang, 2009, 
p. 41).  By negotiating with PRC, in turn, Latin American countries are doing the same:  They 
are diversifying their foreign relationships as to reduce their dependency on the U.S.—and 
thereby reducing U.S. influence over the region.  However, most importantly, Latin American 
countries see PRC’s rise as a model of what they can become if they implement the necessary 
reforms. As Javier Santiso (2007), the Director of the ESADE Centre on global Economy and 
Geopolitics in Spain, notes: “After all, for the first time in its history Latin America can benefit 
not from one but three major world growth engines” (p. 14).  The difference is that, unlike 
America and Europe, China is the only economic superpower that Latin Americans have seen 
rise in times of globalization and relative peace.   
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Yet, PRC’s incursion into Latin America has been very carefully crafted as to avoid an 
open conflict with the U.S. in the latter’s so called “backyard.”  PRC has taken a neutral position 
on many issues involving the region and the U.S. (Hsiang, 2009).  This is because PRC wants to 
“avoid any public confrontation with the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere” (Hsiang, 2009, p. 38).   
Gonzalo S. Paz, a Professor of International Relations at George Washington University, in his 
essay Rising China’s Offensive in Latin America and the U.S. Latin America and the U.S. 
Reaction, points out that while “China is not trying to challenge American hegemony in Latin 
America, [it] is the first Asian country to push enough to concern American analysts” (Paz, 
2006).  However, because PRC’s interest in Latin America has focused on economics—securing 
food, energy source, and commodities—and the U.S. has perceived PRC’s deals in the region as 
legitimate under the international framework of the World Trade Organization, PRC involvement 
in the region “has not sparked strong U.S. reactions yet” (Paz, 2006, p. 105).   
At least for the short term, the U.S. does not represent PRC’s real political contender in 
the region—PRC’s real political fight in Latin America is with ROC.  It’s no secret that PRC 
pursues a “One-China Policy” with every country it establishes diplomatic or commercial 
relations.  The “One-China Policy” holds that in order to establish diplomatic or commercial 
relations with PRC, the country in question has to recognize the People Republic of China (PRC) 
rather than recognizing or maintaining relations with ROC (Jenkins & Peters, 2009).  Latin 
America constitutes, perhaps, the most important region of influence for ROC since out of the 
twenty or so countries that still maintain official diplomatic relations with ROC, at least fifty-
percent of them are Latin American countries (Erickson, & Chen, 2007).  PRC has been 
relatively successful in its fight against ROC in the Latin American front.  For instance, over the 
past three decades, several Latin American countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, and others have abandoned their recognition of ROC; Paraguay is the only South American 
country still officially recognizing ROC (Erickson, & Chen, 2007).  However, ROC still 
maintains commercial relations with several Latin American countries who now recognize PRC.   
But the fight between PRC and ROC over influence in Latin America is really, indirectly, 
a fight with the U.S.  During the Cold War, many considered Taiwan not only a strong U.S. ally, 
but a U.S. satellite in the region (Erickson, & Chen, 2009, p. 70).  Even though the U.S. no 
longer recognizes ROC, it still protects the country militarily and has diplomatic relations with 
the country.  Hsiang (2009) notes that even though the U.S. only has commercial relationships 
with ROC, both countries engage in “transit diplomacy” since Taiwanese officials en route to 
Latin America often stop in the U.S. to hold meetings with important U.S. policymakers.  If  
PRC ousts ROC from Latin America, it will reduce the support for ROC sovereignty in the world 
and weaken America’s quest for protection of ROC since the U.S. could potentially be seen as 
the sole protector of the island.  Such an outcome could create more pressure for the U.S.  at 
home and from PRC to abandon its relations with ROC altogether as the protection of ROC 
already costs the U.S. hundreds of millions and PRC try to increase  its leverage over the U.S. 
through the former’s massive holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated 
assets.     
 China’s economic ascent and its involvement in Latin America can have long-lasting 
effects in the region—and these effects could be very positive.  PRC, with its excess reserves and 
willingness to invest in Latin America, could emerge as an alternative for the development 
strategy the region wants to pursue.  In his widely praised book, Globalization and its 
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Discontents, Nobel Laureate and former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz describes 
how Western-dominated global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) 
and the World Bank, have not taken into account the needs and opinions of their clients—mostly 
developing countries—in their formulation and implementation of policies set forth as conditions 
for the provision of aid or loans for countries in need.  As Stiglitz (2002) notes: “Ideology [free 
market fundamentalism] guided policy prescription and countries were expected to follow the 
IMF guidelines without debate” (p. XIV), or not accept the money. Their choice.  
Unlike the IMF, which provides loans to countries in crisis based on countries’ 
compliance with specific conditions, PRC does not impose such restrictive covenants and as such 
could emerge as the banker of choice for Latin American countries.  In fact, PRC has offered 
economic aid to other developing countries with “no strings attached” as to the enactment and 
implementation of specific policies; the only requirement, it seems, is accepting PRC 
investments (Walker, & Cook, 2010).  This suggests that PRC could well create an investment 
fund to provide aid and investments to Latin America with no strings attached, which could lead 
many Latin American countries to seek PRC’s help instead of the IMF’s in times of crisis.  
Seeking PRC’s help could be potentially better for  Latin America since it would  not have to 
enact specific policies to receive the aid and would have greater say as to the use of the funds 
received.   
But the U.S. would probably oppose an overt Chinese effort to become Latin America’s 
bank of choice.  The U.S. exercises substantial influence within the IMF.  In fact, the U.S. is the 
single country with veto power within the organization (Stiglitz, 2002), and having PRC as the 
IMF’s competitor in Latin America would certainly run against U.S. interests in the region given 
the region’s traditional status as one of the major clients of the IMF.  The U.S., joined by the 
IMF, has already opposed Chinese and Japanese efforts to create an Asian Monetary Fund 
(Stiglitz, 2002).  As Stiglitz (2002) points out: “While the IMF was a strong advocate of 
competition in markets, it did not want competition in its own domain, and the Asian Monetary 
Fund would provide that” (p. 112).  A Chinese attempt to create a Chinese Development Bank 
for Latin American would also run against the efforts of the U.S. backed Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), of which PRC is now a member.  Therefore, because the U.S. would 
oppose such an initiative and it would be a duplicate of the Inter-American Development Bank, it 
would not be wise for PRC to pursue the establishment of such a bank for the region.  This 
indicates that PRC will continue to provide aid and investments to Latin American countries in 
an informal way for the near future rather than risk losing involvement with the World Bank and 
IMF.  
 In the short term, at least, PRC does not represent a major threat to U.S. economic 
hegemony in the region.  The U.S. continues to hold significant influence over the main 
international institutions upon which Latin Americans rely, such as the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the IADB—and a PRC development bank for the region is not a likely option for the short 
term.  Most important, the U.S. still has more investments in the region than PRC does, 
continues to be the region’s main trading partner and recipient of the region’s legal and illegal 
immigrants, and is in a better geographical position to engage and improve its relationship with 
Latin American countries.  
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How Can the US thrive in its Relations with Latin American Countries in the Face of 
Imminent Presence of other Superpowers in the Region?  
 Due to its non-confrontational approach in engaging the countries of the region, Latin 
American countries perceive PRC as a “champion of a multipolar world” (Paz, 2006, p. 101).  
Unlike the U.S., PRC has neither intervened in any Latin American country economically or 
militarily, nor supported overtly or secretly any attempts to overthrow a Latin American 
democratically elected government.  In fact, PRC has deployed its military only once to support 
the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti (Paz, 2006).  The U.S., in contrast, due 
to its military interventions and secret or, in some instances, overt support for the overthrow of 
some Latin American democratically elected governments, such as Chile’s Salvador Allende, has 
been perceived as  the imperial force in the region.  But according to Venezuela’s President, 
Hugo Chavez, things have changed.  Mr. Chavez, one of the most ardent opponents of U.S. 
hegemony in the region noted that “[after] 100 years of domination by the United States… [n]ow 
we are free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland” (Dumbaugh, & 
Sullivan, 2005, p.4).   
 In the face of competition in its main geographical sphere of economic and diplomatic 
influence and its damaged reputation in such region, the U.S. needs to repair its image in the 
region and change its historic approach in dealing with the individual Latin American countries.  
America needs to engage Latin American countries, not as countries in need of its help, but 
rather as partners at the same level.  Of course, Latin America as a whole is still a region in 
development and in need of U.S. investments.  However, like never before, Latin America has 
another option.  PRC provides a sustainable option based on PRC’s interest in the region and 
amount in foreign reserves, and the current economic situation of the U.S. and its growing 
interest in other parts of the world through its War on Terrorism.   
 In trying to engage Latin American countries as a partner and in a multipolar world, the 
U.S. could choose from a variety of policy choices.  Here are a few options.   
• The U.S. should, not only continue to establish free trade agreements and other sort of 
economic agreements with Latin American countries, but it should also review the 
agreements that have been already implemented as to make them fairer for developing 
countries in the region.  For instance, most Latin American countries focus on 
agricultural products and cannot compete with U.S. farmers who have better equipment 
and receive subsidies from the U.S. government.  In addition, Latin American countries 
still depend heavily on the U.S. market for most of their exports and imports, and cannot 
bargain for better contract terms under such conditions.  Therefore, these agreements 
represent cases of unequal bargaining, which accompanied by the U.S. reputation in the 
region, result in more skepticism from Latin American countries towards America and its 
goals—and PRC is already taking note and advantage of the situation.   
• The U.S. should expand its Fulbright Scholarship Program and offer more opportunities 
to Latin American students to study in the U.S.  Studying in the U.S. is a privilege which 
few Latin Americans, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, have.  In order 
to increase its influence in Latin America in the face of competition from other emerging 
superpowers, the U.S. should increase its funding of educational programs with Latin 
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American countries since the U.S. needs to win the most important war—the war of 
ideas—and U.S. educated Latin Americans will be the best emissaries of U.S. intentions 
in the region.   
• The U.S. government and the U.S. Chambers of Commerce of each Latin American 
country could design a joint strategy to engage American and business leaders of the 
region to create better opportunities for people in Latin America.  If the people in the 
lower ranks of Latin American societies see a coordinated effort from the U.S. and its 
multinational corporations to not only increase their profits in the region, but also to 
create meaningful and sustainable job opportunities for them, they will be the first to 
elect leaders who are pro-progress and pro-American, which may mean the same.  If the 
population sees American multinational companies only seeking profits and not caring 
about the population they serve, they will lean towards electing people who promise to 
fight against U.S. interests in the particular country.   
• Finally, the U.S. can thrive in Latin America again by increasing its foreign aid in Latin 
America.  After 9/11 the U.S. became inattentive of Latin America and focused on 
providing more aid to countries in the Middle East because of the War on Terror (Hsiang, 
2009).  The U.S. must offer once again, not only military support for Latin America, but 
also more economic assistance in order to regain its lost ground in the region and defeat 
the demagogues who would do anything to blame the U.S. for the problems they have 
created or have not been able to solve for their countries.   
 
A Last Word:  Recoup  
 Recoup.  The Obama Administration has been very careful and skillful in reaching out to 
Latin America.  It has reached out to the different countries, even those who have governments 
in place who oppose U.S. involvement in the region.  Hugo Chavez, Venezuela’s President, for 
instance, hugged President Obama and gave him a book titled “Open Veins of Latin America: 
Five Centuries of Pillage of a Continent”—something that probably would not have occurred 
during the Bush Administration.  In addition, the Obama Administration has lifted some 
restrictions for traveling to Cuba—another big step in trying to improve its image in Latin 
America.   
 However, the Obama Administration has yet to take specific steps to help Latin America 
develop.  PRC offers Latin America an alternative to development because PRC has risen to 
economic superpower status in the last thirty (30) years, something that Latin Americans have 
seen with their own eyes.  This is the shift.  In order for the U.S. to regain its lost influence in the 
region and thrive in Latin America with PRC as a close competitor, it needs to approach the 
region de novo.  It can no longer approach the region as it did in the past because the same 
methods that failed in the past will fail again.  PRC does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. 
hegemony in the region, but it indicates a shift in the world and in Latin America: We now live 
in a world post-U.S. unilateralism.  We now live in a multipolar world—a world dominated not 
by one country or superpower, but by many.  And the U.S. should take note of that in dealing 
with Latin America.  Recoup.   
China in Latin America:  A Contemporary Story 
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